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The Sports Illustrated Canada Controversy:
Canada "Strikes Out" in Its Bid to Protect Its
Periodical Industry from U.S. Split-Run
Periodicals
Aaron Scow
Canada and the United States share a long history based on
their similar economic interests. Since the 1950s, a tension has
evolved between the two relating to trade in cultural goods and
services.' Recently, this tension was illustrated through dis-
putes on issues ranging from broadcasting2 to split-run periodi-
cals. 3 In the Sports Illustrated Canada dispute, Time Warner,
Inc. ("Time Warner"), the parent company of Sports Illustrated,
violated the spirit of a Canadian law4 prohibiting split-run peri-
odicals 5 by publishing a split-run edition in Canada. In re-
sponse, Canada passed an Excise Tax that made it prohibitively
expensive for Time Warner to continue publishing the split-run
edition. 6
1. See generally Andrew M. Carlson, Note, The Country Music Television
Dispute: An Illustration of the Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protection-
ism and American Entertainment Exports, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 585, 586-
88 (1997) (discussing the background of the tension between domestic Canadian
culture and entertainment and the export of U.S. culture and entertainment).
2. See Two Senators Say U.S. Ready to Retaliate in Cable TV Fight with
Canada, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 16, 1994, at 25. The United States and Can-
ada recently settled the Country Music Television ("CMT") dispute. U.S. Drops
Plan for Canada Sanctions After Commercial Deal Reached, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
June 23, 1995, at 3. In the CMT dispute, the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission revoked CMT's cable license in Canada in
June 1994 and replaced CMT with a Canadian-owned country music television
station. Two Senators Say U.S. Ready to Retaliate in Cable TV Fight with Can-
ada, supra, at 3. Consequently, the United States threatened to retaliate if
Canada failed to rectify the situation. Id. The dispute potentially could have
resulted in a trade war in cultural products between the United States and
Canada. The issue, though, was resolved when CMT and the Canadian-owned
New Country Network reached a commercial agreement in which CMT was al-
lowed to purchase a minority interest in the New Country Network. U.S. Drops
Plan for Canada Sanctions After Commercial Deal Reached, supra, at 25.
3. See infra notes 74-100 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 64-67.
5. See infra notes 35-37, 78 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
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The U.S. government responded by initiating dispute settle-
ment proceedings in the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 7
The United States alleged that the Excise Tax and other related
trade obstacles utilized by the Canadian government violated
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").8 The
United States succeeded on all of its allegations. 9
This dispute and its resolution raise a wide range of issues.
First, they illustrate the interplay between the respective scopes
of GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"). 10 Second, they provide an opportunity to investigate
the alternative courses of action Canada could have taken to re-
solve the Sports Illustrated Canada controversy. Third, they
raise interesting questions about the possibly overlapping juris-
dictions between the WTO and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the resulting potential for forum shop-
ping in international trade disputes. Finally, they underscore
the continued tension between the two countries over the issue
of cultural sovereignty.
This Note analyzes the decisions rendered by the Panel and
Appellate Body in this dispute and offers possible GATT-consis-
tent alternative courses of action for Canada. Part I of this Note
discusses past and present Canadian-American trade relations
and the events that led to the Sports Illustrated Canada contro-
versy. Part II summarizes the decisions rendered by the Panel
and the Appellate Body. Part III critiques those decisions, find-
ing that, although they were mainly correct, important issues
remain concerning how GATT will be applied to future disputes
of this type. This Note posits that the international economic
system must address issues of conflict between established mul-
tilateral agreements and emerging regional trade agreements
that contain terms inconsistent with the past agreements and
thus permit the use of past multilateral agreements to under-
mine regional agreements.
7. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text; see also Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO].
8. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text; see also The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
9. See infra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.
10. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994)
[hereinafter GATS].
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP
The United States is a daily presence in the life of every
Canadian, through television programming, sports, and film.
The common language and geographic proximity of Canada and
the United States cause Canadians to view their culture as be-
ing very vulnerable to influence by U.S cultural exports.'1 In
addition, the large population disparity between the two coun-
tries further increases the fear of a U.S. cultural monopoly. 12
Many Canadians believe that an American value system and
lifestyle would be imposed upon the Canadian people if Canada
allowed unfettered free trade in cultural products with the
United States.1 3 Consequently, many Canadians ultimately
view the cultural exemption contained in NAFTA14 as a means
of preserving their "national" sovereignty.15
The United States, on the other hand, has argued that "cul-
ture" is synonymous with entertainment and is, therefore, a
11. See John Herd Thompson, Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty:
Protection, Promotion, and Popular Culture, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BOR-
DERS? 269, 271 (Stephen J. Randall et al. eds., 1992). Eighty percent of the
Canadian population lives within 100 kilometers of the U.S. border. Id. See
also David Crane, The New International Competitive Environment: A Cana-
dian Perspective, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 15, 23 (1995). A national poll in Canada
showed that 53% of Canadian residents were concerned that transborder infor-
mation flows would undermine Canadian values and identity. Id. Moreover,
62% believed the government had a role to play in preventing this from occur-
ring. Id.
12. Canada has a population of 30 million, compared to 266 million in the
United States. First Submission of Canada in Canada-Certain Measures Con-
cerning Periodicals, 19XX WL 213177 (W.T.O.) (Sept. 26, 1996), 20, n.13
[hereinafter First Submission of Canada].
13. See Graham Carr, Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of
Culture: An International Perspective on FTA, CAN.-AM. PUB. POL'Y No. 6, June
1991, at 1, 26 (explaining that the free flow of information is a way of imposing
value systems on vulnerable societies). See also Clint N. Smith, Note, Interna-
tional Trade in Television Programming and GATT: An Analysis of Why the
European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 97, 133 (1993) (explaining
that social scientists agree that the mass media are important vehicles for the
acceleration of social change and the influencing of viewers' attitudes and
behavior).
14. See infra notes 42-46.
15. See Carr, supra note 13, at 37 (explaining how the FTA, the predeces-
sor to NAFTA, used the cultural exemption to protect Canada's cultural
sovereignty).
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tradable commodity. 16 In essence, American "culture" is an out-
growth of a country's economic machine and is just like any
other big business. 17 Based on this economics-driven view of
"culture," the U.S. government has argued that Canada's claim
of cultural sovereignty is merely a vehicle for disguised
protectionism. 18
B. THE CANADIAN AND U.S. PERIODICAL INDUSTRIES
Traditionally, Canada has exhibited concern about the in-
ability of its periodicals to compete with the foreign periodicals
sold in Canada. As a result, Canada has formed numerous com-
missions to examine the Canadian periodical industry and make
recommendations on how to maintain its viability. In 1951, the
Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters
and Sciences was the first commission to examine the status of
Canadian publications in relation to foreign publications circu-
lated in Canada. It determined that periodicals were very influ-
ential in the development of "national understanding.' 9 In
1961, the O'Leary Royal Commission concluded that Canadian
periodicals could only survive if they were ensured a fair share
of Canadian advertising revenues. 20 The O'Leary Commission
recommended the enactment of Section 19 of the Income Tax
Act 2 ' and an Import Ban 22 to protect the Canadian periodical
industry. Both of these recommendations were subsequently en-
acted into law by the Canadian government.23
The Canadian periodical industry presently remains in a
developmental stage.24 It has not attained the maturity and
16. Michael Braun & Leigh Parker, Trade in Culture: Consumable Product
or Cherished Articulation of a Nation's Soul?, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155,
165 (1993).
17. Carlson, supra note 1, at 614. The chief U.S. argument is that cultural
exemptions are nothing more than protectionism. Id. See also Laurie Watson,
Cultural Sovereignty Issue, UPI, June 29, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, UPI File. The fear of losing cultural sovereignty has little meaning in
the U.S. Id. Indeed, during the talks leading up to the FTA, the chief U.S.
delegate, Peter Murphy, was characterized as holding the view that "the vague
nationalistic concept of cultural sovereignty is little more than hogwash." Id.
18. Watson, supra note 17.
19. A Question of Balance: Report of the Task Force on the Canadian Mag-
azine Industry 77 (1994) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
20. Id. at 78.
21. Id.; see also infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 78. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 78.
24. Cathleen Cole, Canadian Publishers Wary of Trade Pact: North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, FOLIO, Apr. 1, 1992, at 52.
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economies of scale exhibited by its American counterpart.25 In
1993, for example, the U.S. periodical industry was expected to
generate revenues of $22.7 billion.26 In contrast, from 1991 to
1992, total sales for the entire Canadian periodical industry
were only $846.4 million.27
The financial position of the Canadian periodical industry is
also unsecure. For example, in 1991 overall pre-tax profits
earned by Canadian periodicals constituted only two percent of
their total revenues. 28 Based on this small profit margin, the
Canadian Magazine Publishers Association ("CMPA") has esti-
mated that a mere three percent shift in Canadian advertising
revenue to American publications would destroy the entire Ca-
nadian periodical industry's profits.29 Therefore, Canada has
used various subsidies30 and tax provisions3 l in an effort to pro-
tect and maintain its periodical industry.
Circulation revenue and advertising revenue are the two
main sources of income for Canadian periodicals. 32 Of these two
sources, advertising revenue is clearly the more essential reve-
nue component, accounting for sixty-four percent of revenue.33
Circulation revenue, on the other hand, comprises only twenty-
nine percent of the total revenue generated by Canadian
periodicals.34
Imported split-run periodicals, under Canadian law, are
particularly disfavored products because of their ability to offer
significantly lower advertising rates. To create a split-run peri-
odical, the publisher essentially separates ("splits") the editorial
content and the advertising content of the periodical.35 The pe-
riodical is then produced in two or more separate regional edi-
tions, with each sharing essentially the same editorial content
but possessing entirely different advertising content. The pub-
25. Id.
26. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 21.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 92.
29. Richard Siklos, Sports Illustrated Plan Stirs Murky Debate in Canada:
"Canadian Edition a Threat to Domestic Industry?, " FIN. POST, Jan. 26, 1993, at
11.
30. See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
31. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1, § 19 (1985, 5th Supp.) (Can.).
32. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 9.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id. at 9.
35. See First Submission of the United States of America in Canada-Cer-
tain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 1996 WL 900387 (W.T.O.) (Sept. 5,
1996), [ 5 [hereinafter First Submission of the U.S.].
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lisher sells the advertising space to advertisers in the regional
market in which the particular edition is circulated. Conse-
quently, the advertising content in each regional edition is
targeted specifically at the particular regional market in which
the periodical circulates. 36
The overriding incentive for publishing a split-run edition is
profit. The publisher can earn a substantial profit from adver-
tising revenue, while incurring few additional costs, in publish-
ing a split-run edition. This occurs because the costs of
producing the editorial content are absorbed by the production
of the domestic edition. 37 The only cost incurred in producing
the split-run edition is the cost of printing it. These low produc-
tion costs allow split-run editions to offer substantially dis-
counted advertising prices compared to non-split-run editions.
C. THE FTA, NAFTA, AND GATT
The United States and Canada, the world's largest bilateral
trading partners,38 consummated the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") on January 1, 1989.39 This
Agreement sought to eliminate, over a ten-year period, virtually
all tariffs imposed on trade between the two countries. 40 Fur-
thermore, it curtailed the implementation of nontariff barriers,
implemented new dispute settlement procedures, and allowed
expanded access to government procurement. 41
Most importantly, though, it broadly exempted cultural
products ("cultural exemption") from its general free trade provi-
sions.42 Under the FTA, cultural products included the publica-
tion, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or
36. Id.
37. See First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 20 (citing Task Force
Report, supra note 19, at 49) (explaining that a foreign publisher can easily
make a profit because its fixed costs were recovered in its home market).
38. Frank James, NAFTA Mostly a Success, Administration Reports Pre-
dictions Accurate, Daley Says; Expanding Pact Will Be Pushed, CH. TRIB., July
11, 1997. See generally Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 Am. J. INT'L
LAw 394 (1990) (discussing the trade relationship between the United States
and Canada).
39. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22-23, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988,
Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter FTA].
40. Fredric C. Menz & Sarah A. Stevens, Editors' Introduction to Economic
Opportunities in FREER U.S. TRADE WITH CANADA 13, 22 (Fredric C. Menz &
Sarah A. Stevens eds., 1991).
41. Raby, supra note 38, at 395.
42. FTA, art. 2005.
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newspapers. 43 The cultural exemption permitted the regulation
of trade in cultural products in ways that would be otherwise
inconsistent with the FTA.
After Canada and the United States entered into the FTA,
Canada, Mexico, and the United States agreed to the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") on December 17,
1992.4 4 As a result, the FTA was merged into NAFTA and effec-
tively "suspended" during NAFTA's existence. 45 NAFTA pre-
served many of the FTA's provisions, including the cultural
exemption. 4 6 Canada and the United States are still permitted
to enact measures related to cultural products that are other-
wise inconsistent with NAFTA.
Canada and the United States are both members of the
WTO. Unlike the FTA and NAFTA, GATT contains no cultural
exemption. 4 7 In fact, the only provision that specifically applies
to trade in cultural products is Article IV, which exempts quotas
imposed on cinematographic films from Article III's national
treatment requirements. 48 As a result, any trade law involving
cultural products, other than cinematographic films, must be
consistent with the provisions of GATT.
D. CANADIAN PROTECTIONIST MEASURES
Since the early 1900s, Canada had provided favorable pos-
tal rates to support its periodical industry.4 9 The postal rates
were administered through the Canada Post Corporation ("Can-
ada Post"), the Canadian Government's national postal ser-
43. Id. art. 2012(a).
44. North America Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
45. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 489 (3d. ed. 1995).
46. NAFTA, annex 2106. Annex 2106 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as between
Canada and the United States, any measure adopted or maintained
with respect to cultural industries, except as specifically provided in
Article 302 (Market Access-Tariff Elimination), and any measure of
equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be governed
under this Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provisions of
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. The rights and obli-
gations between Canada and any other Party with respect to such
measures shall be identical to those applying between Canada and the
United States.
Id.
47. See generally GATT.
48. Id. art. V.
49. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 72.
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vice.50 The Canadian Department of Communications (now the
Department of Canadian Heritage) made annual payments to
Canada Post51 These payments allowed Canada Post to provide
lower postal rates to Canadian periodicals than it provided to
non-Canadian periodicals.
In addition to supplying funding to Canada Post, the De-
partment of Canadian Heritage regulated the eligibility require-
ments for the favorable postal rates.5 2 Three postal rate
categories were provided for periodicals.5 3 These included the
funded postal rate, the commercial postal rate, and the interna-
tional postal rate.54 Only Canadian periodicals were eligible for
the funded and commercial postal rates.55
Because the Department of Canadian Heritage subsidized
the funded rate, it was significantly lower than the other two
postal rates.5 6 To qualify for the funded rate, a periodical was
required to be published and printed in Canada and had to be:
(a) typeset and edited in Canada; (b) produced and published by
a Canadian citizen, or a corporation controlled by Canadian citi-
50. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 44.
51. Id. See also Memorandum of Agreement Concerning the Publications
Assistance Program Between the Department of Communications and the Can-
ada Post Corporation, Mar. 7, 1996, 3.0. The Department of Canadian Heri-
tage was scheduled to provide funding in the following amounts to Canada Post:
1) $58 million for the May 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997 time period;
2) $57.9 million for the April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998 time period;
and
3) $47.3 million for the April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999 time period.
Id.
52. First submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 45.
53. Id. 38.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. 1 44 (explaining how the Department of Canadian Heritage de-
frays Canada Post's costs for the funded rate). The different postal rates for the
three categories of periodicals are as follows:
International (i.e. imported): $0.436
Commercial: $0.378
Funded: $0.076 (first 10,000 copies of an issue
and $0.084 for additional copies)
(Rates based upon minimum postage per addressed copy.)
Id. [41.
Canada Post also furnished additional discounts, known as "palletization"
and "bypass" discounts, exclusively to Canadian periodicals. Id. 42. Both dis-
counts allowed the Canadian publishers to save money by performing various
bulk packaging functions themselves rather than paying higher postal rates to
have Canada Post perform them. Id. The palletization discount was $0.01 to
$0.02 per copy or $0.10 to $0.30 per package of copies. Id. The by-pass dis-
counts ranged from $150 to $200 per truckload. Id.
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zens; and (c) not published under license from a foreign pub-
lisher, or contain editorial content substantially the same as an
issue printed outside Canada that was not first edited in Can-
ada.57 The Department of Canadian Heritage provided Canada
Post with the names of periodicals that qualified for the funded
rates. 58
The commercial rate was not subsidized and was, therefore,
higher than the funded rate.5 9 The international rate, which ap-
plied to all imported periodicals mailed in Canada, was signifi-
cantly higher than the funded postal rate. In fact, the
international postal rate was eighty-three percent higher than
the funded postal rate and fourteen percent higher than the
commercial postal rate.60 Thus, international publishers were
forced to pay higher postal rates than Canadian publishers to
transport their periodicals to their Canadian customers.
Since 1976, Canada has also used an income tax measure to
encourage Canadian advertisers to place their advertisements
in Canadian periodicals. Section 19 of the Income Tax Act de-
nies deductions for advertising costs incurred by Canadian ad-
vertisers for advertisements placed in non-Canadian periodicals,
newspapers, and broadcasts that are directed primarily at the
Canadian market.61 Only advertisements placed by Canadian
advertisers in Canadian periodicals are tax deductible. 62 To
qualify as a Canadian periodical under Section 19, a periodical
must be at least seventy-five percent Canadian-owned, and its
editorial content must be at least eighty percent different than
the content of an issue of the periodical that was printed, edited,
or published outside Canada.63
Because of their ability to offer substantially lower advertis-
ing rates, split-run periodicals are disfavored by the Canadian
government.64 As a result, Canada passed certain measures to
57. Id. [ 40.
58. Id. T 45.
59. Id. 38.
60. The "international" rate is $0.436, as compared to the $0.076 rate for
the "funded" rate and $0.378 for the "commercial" rate. Id. 40. Thus, the
"international rate" is 83% higher than the "funded" rate, and 14% higher than
the "commercial" rate.
61. Income Tax Act, supra note 31, § 19(1).
62. Id. § 19(5).
63. Id.
64. See Task Force Report, supra note 19, at v (stating that the govern-
ment's long-standing policy objective for Canadian magazines is to ensure ac-
cess to advertising revenues and that split-runs would cause a downward
spiral).
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prevent split-run periodicals from entering the Canadian mar-
ket.65 In 1965, Canada enacted Tariff Code 9958 ("Import
Ban").66 The Import Ban forbade the actual importation of the
hard copy of a split-run periodical into Canada. It was designed
to operate as a barrier to prevent the importation of split-run
periodicals, primarily from the United States, into Canada. 67
On the surface, these Canadian measures and the cultural
exemption do not appear to impose substantial barriers to the
entry and sale of American periodicals in Canada. Currently,
eighty-two percent of all newsstand periodicals sold in Canada
originate from foreign countries, mainly the United States. 68
Seventy-eight percent of all American periodical exports go to
Canada.69 In addition, Canada annually imports twenty-five
times more periodicals from the United States than it exports to
the United States.70
Other U.S. cultural producers are also doing very well in
Canada. Slightly under two-thirds of all books purchased in
Canada are foreign-authored.7 1 Sixty-three percent of Canadian
television viewing time is spent watching non-Canadian pro-
grams, primarily programs originating from the United
States. 72 The United States enjoys a $1.5 billion trade surplus
in cultural products with Canada. 73 Thus, the Canadian market
is a very important export market for U.S. producers of cultural
products.
65. See id. at iii. Since 1965 two legislative measures were put into place
that supported the Canadian magazine industry's flow of advertising. Id.
These measures were primarily put into place to prevent split-run periodicals
from entering the Canadian market. David Crary, Is Canada Putting up a Cul-
tural Wall?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 1, 1996, at 8D.
66. Customs Tariff, R.S.C., ch. 41, § 114, sched. VII, item 9958 (1985, 3rd
Supp.) (Can.) [hereinafter Import Ban].
67. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, [ 7-12.
68. Donald Macdonald, The Canadian Cultural Industries Exemption
Under Canada-U.S. Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253, 254 (1994).
69. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 40.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Macdonald, supra note 65, at 254 (citing David Crane, Canadian Cul-
ture Seen as a Pawn in Free Trade Talks, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 4, 1986, at A-2).
The United States has, however, typically maintained an overall trade deficit
with Canada. In 1996, for example, the United States had an overall trade
deficit of $21.7 billion with Canada. James, supra note 38.
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E. THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE SPORTS ILLUSTRATED CANADA
CONTROVERSY
The perpetual debate between Canada and the United
States concerning cultural products recently returned to the
forefront when Time Warner decided to publish and distribute a
split-run edition of Sports Illustrated in Canada. The first cop-
ies of Sports Illustrated Canada hit Canadian newsstands on
April 5, 1993,74 and it quickly became a popular sports periodi-
cal there.7 5 Canadian advertisers wanted to advertise in Sports
Illustrated Canada because it offered substantially lower adver-
tising rates than similar domestic periodicals and also possessed
a substantial readership base in Canada.7 6 Sports Illustrated
Canada's instant success produced an uproar within the Cana-
dian periodical community, which feared this type of publication
would usurp the profits the industry derived from Canadian ad-
vertisers and cause irreparable damage to the industry.7 7
Since 1965, the Import Ban had effectively prevented the
importation of split-run periodicals like Sports Illustrated Can-
ada into Canada. Time Warner, though, bypassed the Import
Ban by utilizing technological equipment that did not exist when
Canada enacted the Ban. Time Warner produced the pages of
74. U.S. Weighing Retaliation Options on Canadian Magazine Tax, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Dec. 22, 1995, at 5.
75. See Lorne Manly, Canada Could Get Pricey for Split-Run Editions, Fo-
LIO, Nov. 15, 1995, at 38 (estimating that Sports Illustrated Canada earned
about $1.8 million a year in advertising).
76. See U.S. Weighing Retaliation Options on Canadian Magazine Tax,
supra note 74, at 5. In 1993, a full-page ad in Sports Illustrated Canada cost
$6250, compared with $25,400 in Maclean's, one of the leading periodicals in
Canada. Id. Because Sports Illustrated had already established its editorial
content through the production of its American edition, which covered its fixed
costs, the only costs it incurred in publishing its Canadian edition were variable
costs, such as printing costs. Id.
77. See Peter C. Newman, The Canadian Dream Loses a Big Round,
MACLEAN'S, Jan. 27, 1997, at 56 (claiming that "[wihat's at stake is nothing less
than the [Canadian) magazine's industry's continued existence"). Some forty
U.S. periodicals with Canadian circulations of 50,000 or more were ready to
launch their own split-run editions soon after Sports Illustrated Canada began
publication. Id. See also Dian Turbide with Anthony Wilson-Smith, Minister in
the Hot Seat: Michael Dupuy is Responsible for Culture at a Volatile Time,
MACLEAN'S, May 9, 1994, at 54 (discussing the difficulties facing Canadian Heri-
tage Minister Dupuy and how publishers are "distressed"); Patricia Chisholm,
Plugging a Loophole: Ottawa Moves to Protect Canadian Magazines,
MACLEAN'S, Aug. 2, 1993, at 40 (explaining how the advent of Sports Illustrated
Canada caused consternation among Canadian publishers); Richard Siklos,
Magazine Report Pleases No One: Problem of Ersatz Canadian Editions Back in
Ottawa's Lap, FIN. POST, Mar. 31, 1994, at 14 (discussing Canadian publishers'
reactions to Sports Illustrated Canada).
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its Sports Illustrated Canada editions at its headquarters in
New York and then transmitted them via satellite to the Com-
pany's printing plant north of Toronto.78 Using this technique,
Time Warner was able to distribute the split-run edition in Can-
ada without violating the Import Ban, because no hard copy ever
physically crossed the U.S.-Canadian border. These actions,
though, obviously served to frustrate the law's underlying
purpose.
In addition to the Import Ban, Section 19 of the Income Tax
Act79 had previously also caused a significant number of Cana-
dian advertisers to avoid advertising in foreign periodicals.
However, the introduction of Sports Illustrated Canada, along
with its significantly lower advertising rates, decreased Section
19's ability to influence Canadian advertisers. The lower adver-
tising rates more than offset the lost income tax deductions.
Thus, the income tax deductions were ineffective in preventing
Canadian advertisers from placing their advertisements in
Sports Illustrated Canada.
After Time Warner announced its plan to publish a split-
run edition in Canada, the Canadian government formed a Task
Force to examine the Canadian periodical industry. The Task
Force's purpose was to recommend legislative measures that
would ensure an adequate flow of advertising revenue to the Ca-
nadian periodicals.80 After a thorough examination of the Cana-
dian periodical industry, the Task Force recommended that an
excise tax8 ' be used to prevent the entry of imported split-run
periodicals into Canada.8 2
On December 15, 1995, the Canadian government enacted
the Excise Tax Act ("Excise Tax").8 3 This new law applied an
eighty percent excise tax on the value of the advertisements ap-
pearing in split-run periodicals.8 4 The Excise Tax essentially
78. Peter Benesh, New Sports Illustrated Riles Canada, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Apr. 14, 1993, at C5.
79. See supra notes 61-63.
80. See Task Force Report, supra note 19, at iii.
81. An excise tax is a "tax imposed on the performance of an act, the engag-
ing in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
563 (6' ed. 1990).
82. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 64.
83. See An Act to Amend the Excise Tax Act and the Income Tax Act, ch.
46, 1995 S.C. (Can.) [hereinafter Excise Tax Act].
84. Id. § 36(1). The eighty percent tax was assessed on the split-run peri-
odicals based on the total gross fees collected by the publisher for all advertise-
ments included in the Canadian edition. Id. § 38. The tax was payable by the
end of the month following the month in which the Canadian edition of the
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sought to preclude Time Warner, and the numerous U.S. period-
ical publishers who were considering publishing split-run edi-
tions, from distributing such editions in Canada.85
The Canadian government made the Excise Tax retroac-
tively applicable to all split-run editions that began publication
after March 1993, subject to a grandfather provision.86 This
grandfather provision provided an annual exemption from the
Excise Tax for the number of split-run editions that a company
had published in the twelve month period immediately preced-
ing March 26, 1993.87 For example, a split-run periodical that
had published twelve issues between March 26, 1992 and March
25, 1993, could continue to publish twelve issues a year without
paying the Excise Tax. If a thirteenth issue were published, the
Excise Tax would be applied on the value of the advertisements
appearing in that issue.
Canada included this provision to avoid the application of
the Excise Tax to long-established foreign split-run periodicals,
including Time and Reader's Digest, which each published a Ca-
nadian edition.88 The Excise Tax did, however, apply to all the
periodical was published. Id. § 37. The "responsible person" resident in Can-
ada was to pay the tax. Id. § 36(2). Section 35(1) defines a "split-run edition" as
an edition of a periodical:
(a) that is distributed in Canada,
(b) in which more than 20% of the editorial material is the same or
substantially the same as editorial material that appears in one or
more excluded editions of one or more issues of one or more peri-
odicals, and
c) that contains an advertisement that does not appear in identical
form in all those excluded editions.
Id. § 35(1).
In addition, section 35(1) defines an "excluded edition" as "an edition of the
issue the circulation of which in Canada, if any, is less than its circulation
outside Canada .... " Id.
85. See Newman, supra note 77 (explaining that the purpose of the tax was
to prevent U.S. periodicals from launching split-run publications in Canada).
See also Canadian Commission Softens Call for Discrimination in AV Sector,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 13, 1995, at 12, 14 (reporting that Canadian officials
have said that "the tax will be applied to all split-runs, regardless of country of
origin."). The new law sought to prevent foreign split-run periodicals, such as
Sports Illustrated Canada, from taking advertising revenues away from the Ca-
nadian magazine industry. See id. at 13 (reporting on Minister of Department
of Canadian Heritage Michel Dupuy's statement that without the new law, the
Canadian magazine industry could lose 40% of its advertising revenue in the
next five years).
86. Excise Tax Act, supra note 83, § 39.
87. Id.
88. Id. Time and Reader's Digest were exempted in 1965 under the original
Excise Tax Act. Crary, supra note 65, at 8D.
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editions published by Sports Illustrated Canada, because it did
not begin publication until April 1993.89
According to the Canadian government, the Excise Tax was
necessary because the Canadian periodical industry was in dan-
ger of being overrun by the larger and wealthier American peri-
odical industry.90 The Task Force concluded that "split-run
[periodicals] have the potential to grab 40 per cent of Canadian
[periodical] advertising revenues."91 According to the United
States, the Excise Tax was a discriminatory trade measure en-
acted specifically to evict an American business from the Cana-
dian market.92  The United States asserted that "[t]he
predictable effect of this confiscatory excise tax was to force
Time Warner to discontinue the publication of Sports Illustrated
Canada and also to ensure that no new foreign-based split-run
editions are distributed in Canada."93 In addition, according to
the United States, Canada's retroactive application of the tax to
periodicals that began publication after March 26, 1993 revealed
its confiscatory character and protectionist nature, because the
tax reached back more than two years prior to its enactment to
eliminate Sports Illustrated Canada.94
The Excise Tax ultimately forced Time Warner to suspend
publication of Sports Illustrated Canada.95 The eighty percent
Excise Tax rendered the publication of this split-run edition eco-
nomically unfeasible. 96 The enactment of the Excise Tax consti-
tuted a complete change of policy by the Canadian government
regarding the publication of Sports Illustrated Canada. Before
Time Warner decided to publish its Canadian edition of Sports
Illustrated, Investment Canada had advised Time Warner that
89. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 34.
90. See Canadian Commission Softens Call for Discrimination in AV Sec-
tor, supra note 85, at 13 (reporting the statement of Minister Dupuy that "the
threat to the health of the [Canadian periodical industry] is real.").
91. Canadian Heritage, News Release Communiqud: House of Commons
Passes Bill C-103 (Nov. 3, 1995).
92. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, T 34-35. But see Second
Submission of Canada in Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
19XX WL 213178 (W.T.O.) (Nov. 1, 1996), 23 [hereinafter Second Submission
of Canada] (claiming that the date chosen was not an arbitrary choice since it
was the date on which the Task Force of the Canadian Magazine Industry was
established).
93. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 35.
94. Id. 55.
95. See Sports Illustrated Suspends Publication Pending End to Tax Dis-
pute, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 12, 1996, at 19.
96. U.S. Initiates WTO Case Over Canadian Split-Run Policies, Postal
Rates, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 15, 1996, at 6.
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a Canadian edition would not be inconsistent with any Cana-
dian law. 97 Relying on this representation, Time Warner com-
menced the publication of Sports Illustrated Canada.98 The
subsequent enactment of the Excise Tax reversed the Canadian
government's policy regarding Sports Illustrated Canada. Time
Warner strongly considered individually challenging the consti-
tutionality of the Excise Tax under Canadian law.99 Ultimately,
though, the conflict was dealt with by the United States' initia-
tion of dispute settlement proceedings against Canada in the
World Trade Organization. 10 0
II. THE RESOLUTION OF THE SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
CONTROVERSY
A. THE UNITED STATES INVOKES DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCEDURES IN THE WTO
In the Sports Illustrated Canada controversy, the main con-
cern for the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") was
securing access for U.S. split-run periodicals to the Canadian
market. The USTR explored its options for retaliating against
the Excise Tax. It ultimately chose to initiate dispute settle-
ment in the WTO in the context of a Section 301
investigation. 101
97. See First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 1 16.
98. Id.
99. SI Canada Poised to Challenge Constitutionality of Advertising Tax, IN-
SIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 25, 1995, at 4. Sports Illustrated Canada considered
challenging the tax as violating three separate provisions of the Canadian con-
stitution. Id. First, under Canadian law, taxes must raise revenue and be of
general application. Id. Since no split-run editions would sell advertising at
the proposed eighty percent level of taxation, the tax would raise no revenue
and therefore would violate the Canadian law. Id. Second, over the last 100
years, the Canadian judiciary has articulated an "improper purpose doctrine"
that, among other things, bars tax provisions that single out one company or
individual, which Sports Illustrated Canada claimed this tax attempted to ac-
complish. Id. Finally, Sports Illustrated Canada considered challenging the
tax as violating the freedom accorded commercial speech, including the stipula-
tion advertisers should have access to the medium of their choice. Id.
100. See U.S. Initiates WTO Case Over Canadian Split-Run Policies, Postal
Rates, supra note 96, at 6.
101. Id. at 7. Section 301 provides for mandatory action by the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) if "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign
country ... is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce."
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii). Furthermore, it provides for discretionary action
if "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discrimina-
tory and burdens or restricts United States commerce, and . . .action by the
United States is appropriate." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1), (2). In taking action, the
USTR is authorized to initiate many different courses of action, including "sus-
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On March 11, 1996, the United States initiated dispute set-
tlement proceedings in the WNTO and requested consultations 10 2
with Canada pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("DSU")10 3 and GATT Article XXII.1 °4 The United States and
Canada held consultations on April 10, 1996 but were unsuc-
cessful in resolving the dispute.10 5 On May 24, 1996, the United
States requested the establishment of a panel. 0 6 On June 19,
pend[ing the] . . .benefits of trade agreement concessions . . ." or "impos[ing]
duties ... on the goods of ... such foreign country." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(a),
(b). Section 301 requires a determination by the USTR no later than 30 days
after the conclusion of the WTO dispute settlement process or 18 months after
the start of the 301 case, whichever is earlier. Id. See also Trade Act of 1974,
§ 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1994).
102. Consultations are the initial step to dispute resolution in the WTO.
The disputing parties are required to consult with one another with a view to-
ward satisfactorily resolving the dispute. JACKSON, supra note 45, at 341. The
hope is that the parties will resolve their dispute without resorting to the for-
mal dispute settlement procedures. Id. If consultations fail to resolve the dis-
pute within 60 days after the request for consultations, the complaining party
may request the establishment of a panel. Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
103. DSU, art. 4. Under Article 4, consultation between the countries in-
volved in the dispute is the initial step. Id. art. 4.3. If the parties fail to settle
the dispute within 60 days or the parties agree during the 60 day period that
consultations will not resolve the dispute, then the complaining party may re-
quest the establishment of a panel. Id. art. 4.7.
104. GATT, art. XXII:1. Article XXIII:I provides:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or im-
paired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is be-
ing impeded as a result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obliga-
tions under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agree-
ment, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic considera-
tion to the representations or proposals made to it.
Id.
105. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 3.
106. Id. 4.
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1996, the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") assembled a panel
to hear the dispute. 0 7
B. THE DECISION OF THE CANADA-CERTAIN MEASURES
CONCERNING PERIODICALS PANEL
Before the Panel hearing, the United States attacked Can-
ada's favorable postal rates, Import Ban, and Excise Tax. The
United States claimed that the favorable postal rates were an
impermissible internal regulation, violating the requirements of
Article 111:4, and were an impermissible subsidy under Article
III:8(b). l08 In addition, the United States asserted that the Im-
port Ban constituted an impermissible import restriction under
Article XI.10 9 Finally, the United States argued that the Excise
Tax was an impermissible internal tax under Article 111:2.110
Canada responded to the U.S. claims by asserting that its
measures were consistent with its GATT obligations. It claimed
the favorable postal rates were not an impermissible internal
regulation under Article 111:4.111 In the alternative, if the Panel
concluded that the postal rates were inconsistent with Article
111:4, Canada claimed the rates satisfied the requirements of Ar-
ticle III:8(b) and were, therefore, a permissible subsidy.112 Can-
ada admitted that the Import Ban was inconsistent with Article
XI, but claimed that the Import Ban was still permissible be-
cause it satisfied the requirements of the Article XX(d) general
exception. 113 Finally, Canada asserted that the Excise Tax was
a measure applied strictly to advertising services and, conse-
quently, only GATS governed any resolution of this issue.114 In
the alternative, if the panel concluded that GATT also was ap-
plicable to the Excise Tax, Canada claimed that the Excise Tax
was consistent with the national treatment requirements of Ar-
ticle 111:2.115
107. Id.
108. Report of the Panel in Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodi-
cals, WT/DS 31/R, 3.1 (adopted March 14, 1997) [hereinafter Canada-Cer-
tain Measures panel].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. 3.2.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see infra notes 145-156 and accompanying text.
114. Canada--Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 3.2.
115. Id.
MI. J GLOBAL TRADE
1. Favorable Postal Rates
a. Article III:4
The United States claimed that the higher international
postal rates imposed by Canada on imported periodicals, com-
pared to the funded and commercial postal rates paid by the Ca-
nadian periodicals, violated Article III:4 of GATT. 116 Article
III:4 requires that imported products be "accorded treatment no
less favourable" than that accorded to "like domestic prod-
ucts"1 1 7 in regards to all regulations "affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use."
118
With respect to this issue, Canada and the United States
agreed that domestic and imported periodicals constituted like
products and that Canada Post assessed higher postal rates on
imported periodicals than on domestic periodicals. 11 9 Conse-
quently, the key issue was whether Canada Post was "imple-
menting Canadian government policy in such a manner that its
postal rates on periodicals... [could] be viewed as governmental
regulations or requirements for the purposes of Article III:4. ' 120
According to the United States, Canada Post constituted a "gov-
ernment entity fully subject to Canadian Government direction
because it [was] a wholly-government-owned, government-cre-
ated chartered body, managed by a board of directors appointed
by the Canadian Government."1 21 The United States asserted
that statements by Diane Marleau, the Minister responsible for
Canada Post, further demonstrated that even Canada consid-
116. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 80. See supra notes 49-
57 and accompanying text (discussing the three different categories for periodi-
cals and the applicable postal rates for each category).
117. See infra note 169-71 and accompanying text (discussing the "like prod-
ucts" test).
118. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 79-89. See also GATT,
supra note 8, art. III:4. Article III:4 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their inter-
nal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclu-
sively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product.
Id.
119. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, [ 5.33.
120. Id. 5.34.
121. Id.
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ered Canada Post to be a governmental entity.122 Ms. Marleau
had previously stated that "the [Canadian] government regards
Canada Post as a significant federal institution," and that the
"Canada Post is part of the federal government.' 23
Canada, on the other hand, characterized Canada Post as a
private agency with a legal personality distinct from the Cana-
dian government. 124 According to Canada, Canada Post pos-
sessed the ability to make its own decisions, which were
typically based on normal commercial principles. 125 Because of
this, the Canadian government asserted that it exercised no con-
trol over the postal rates Canada Post charged for the delivery of
periodicals. 126
According to the Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Pe-
riodicals panel ("Panel"), to consider a measure enforced by a
private-sector entity a governmental regulation under Article
III:4, two criteria needed to be satisfied. "First, there... [must
be] reasonable grounds to believe that sufficient incentives or
disincentives existed for non-mandatory measures to take effect.
Second, the operation of the measures... [must depend] on Gov-
ernment action or intervention."' 27
Applying these criteria to the Canadian postal rates, the
Panel determined that the postal rates qualified as "regula-
tions.' 28 First, the Panel stated that, based on the control exer-
cised by the Canadian government, it could reasonably assume
that sufficient incentives existed for Canada Post to maintain
the existing pricing policy on periodicals. 129 Thus, the Panel
simply assumed that the first criterion was satisfied.
Second, the Panel concluded Canada Post's operation gener-
ally depended on action or intervention by the Canadian govern-
ment.' 30 Canada Post had a- mandate from the Canadian
government to operate on a "commercial" basis in the periodical
sector.' 3 1 In addition, the Canadian government possessed the
122. Second Submission of the United States of America in Canada-Cer-
tain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 1996 WL 899185 (W.T.O.) (Nov. 1,
1996), 91-92 [hereinafter Second U.S. Submission].
123. Id. 92 (emphasis in original).
124. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, T 5.33.
125. First Submission of Canada, supra note 12, 44.
126. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 5.33.
127. Id. 5.36 (citing Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, May 4, 1988,
GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116, 109 (1988)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. 5.35.
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power to change the postal rates if it considered Canada Post's
pricing policy to be inappropriate. 132 Based on these facts, the
Panel believed that Canada Post generally operated under gov-
ernmental instructions. 133 Thus, the Panel concluded that the
postal rates could be regulations and requirements under Arti-
cle III:4.'13
This conclusion did not completely resolve the issue. Be-
cause Article 111:1 is a general principle that informs the rest of
Article 111,135 the Panel needed to examine the postal rates
under Article III:1 before reaching a final determination on this
issue. Article 111:1 provides that any internal taxes and laws of
the importing country should not be "applied to imported or do-
mestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.1 36
The Panel concluded that the postal rates were inconsistent
with Article 111:1. According to the Panel, "the design, architec-
ture, and structure of Canada Post's different pricing policy" led
to the conclusion that Canada applied the measure "so as to af-
ford protection to the domestic production of periodicals. 1 37
Thus, according to the Panel, the discriminatory application of
the postal rates to periodicals violated Article 111:4.138
b. Article III:8(b)
The Panel concluded that the funded postal rate offered by
Canada Post to certain Canadian publishers qualified as a per-
missible subsidy under Article III:8(b).1 39 Article III:8(b) pro-
vides an exception to Article III's national treatment
requirements for subsidies paid "exclusively to domestic produ-
cers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the
proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. 5.36.
135. Id. 5.37.
136. See GATT, art. II:l. Article III:l provides:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other inter-
nal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the in-
ternal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or propor-
tions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production.
Id.
137. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 5.38.
138. Id. 5.39.
139. Id. 5.44.
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the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through gov-
ernmental purchases of domestic products."1 40 Prior panels had
construed Article III:8(b) very narrowly, and the United States
believed that the Panel should follow this precedent.1 41 The
United States asserted that because the Department of Cana-
dian Heritage paid the money to Canada Post rather than the
Canadian periodical publishers, the payments were not made
exclusively to domestic periodical publishers.1 42 Nevertheless,
the Panel postulated that the transfer of funds from the Depart-
ment of Canadian Heritage to Canada Post merely involved an
internal transfer of resources within the Canadian govern-
ment.1 43 The Panel stated that because Canada Post retained
no economic benefit from the transfer of funds, the funded postal
rate constituted a subsidy paid exclusively to Canadian periodi-
cal publishers and was therefore a permissible subsidy under
Article III:8(b).144
2. Import Ban
Canada conceded that the Import Ban violated Article
XI:1 1 4 5 but claimed that the Import Ban was justified under Ar-
140. GATT, art. III:8(b). Canada argued that the payments to Canada Post
constituted subsidies paid exclusively to domestic producers, as provided in Ar-
ticle III:8(b). First Submission of Canada, supra note 12, 114-115. It claimed
that "[tihe specific form in which the subsidy is paid is irrelevant to the opera-
tion of Article III:8(b), provided that a payment is made by the government for
the exclusive benefit of domestic producers." Id. 117. Canada also asserted
that the current system accomplished the same thing as a payment directly to
the Canadian magazine producers, but under a much more administratively
convenient format. Id. 118.
141. Second U.S. Submission, supra note 122, 104-10 (construing Report
of the Panel on Italian Discrimination Against Agricultural Machinery, Oct. 23,
1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, 14 (1959)); Report of the Panel on
United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19,
1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206, 5.8 (1992); Report of the Panel on
United States-Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and use of
Tobacco, Aug. 12, 1994, DS44/R (Oct. 4, 1994), 109; Report of the Panel on
European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors
and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990,
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86, 137 (1990)).
142. First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, 90.
143. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 5.42.
144. Id. T1 5.44.
145. Id. 5.5. See also GATT, supra note 8, art. XI:1. Article XI:I provides
that:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
265
MNvN. ,J GLOBA.L TRADE
ticle XX(d), which permits certain GATT-inconsistent measures
as long as they are necessary to secure compliance with a GATT-
consistent measure. 146 To satisfy the Article XX(d) exception,
Canada had to demonstrate the following elements:
1. that the particular trade measures, inconsistent with the
General Agreement for which the exception was being in-
voked, secured compliance with laws or regulations them-
selves not inconsistent with the General Agreement;
2. that the inconsistent measures were necessary to secure com-
pliance with those laws or regulations; and
3. that the measures were applied in conformity with the intro-
ductory clause of Article XX.1 47
Important precedent on how to interpret Article XX(d) was set
by the Panel on European Economic-Regulations on Imports of
Parts and Components, which determined that the phrase "to
secure compliance with laws and regulations" in Article XX(d)
meant "to enforce obligations under laws and obligations," and
not merely "to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the
laws and regulations. 1 48
Canada asserted that the Import Ban was necessary to se-
cure compliance with Section 19 of the Income Tax Act.149 Can-
ada also claimed that the Article XX(d) standard should not be
strictly applied to the present dispute. 150 According to Canada,
a strictly applied test "is entirely appropriate where the issue is
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
Id.
146. GATT, art. XX(d). Article XX states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement ....
Id.
147. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 9 5.7 (citing Panel
Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996)).
148. See id. 5.9 (quoting Panel Report on European Economic Commu-
nity-Regulations on Imports of Parts and Components, May 16, 1990, GATT
B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (1990)).
149. First Submission of Canada, supra note 12, T 102; see also Income Tax
Act, supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
150. First Submission of Canada, supra note 12, 102.
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the enforcement of regulatory statutes and ordinary fiscal meas-
ures designed to raise revenue, where compliance with the stat-
ute is virtually synonymous with the attainment of its
objects."' 5 ' On the other hand, Canada asserted that "[ilt is
doubtful . .. that [a strictly applied test] is meaningful in the
case of a fiscal or other economic incentive where formal compli-
ance is not the real object, and substantial compliance cannot be
separated from the underlying social and economic objectives
the measure is designed to secure."' 5 2 Thus, according to Can-
ada, applying the standard more leniently, the Import Ban did
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between domestic
and imported periodicals, and thus was justified under Article
XX(d).15 3
The Panel disagreed with Canada's assertion. It stated that
although the Import Ban may increase "compliance" with Sec-
tion 19 of the Income Tax Act, this was only an incidental effect
caused by a separate measure, distinct from Section 19 and its
objective to entice the placement of advertisements in Canadian
periodicals as opposed to foreign periodicals.' 5 4 The Panel con-
cluded that the Import Ban did not "secure compliance" with
Section 19 of the Income Tax Act.155 Because this element was
not satisfied, the Panel held that the Import Ban was inconsis-
tent with Article XI:1 and not justified under Article XX(d).' 5 6
3. Excise Tax
Canada characterized the Excise Tax as a tax applied to ad-
vertising services and therefore asserted that the Excise Tax is-
sue was governed by GATS, 157 which applies to trade in
151. Id. 101.
152. Id.
153. Id. 103.
154. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 5.10.
155. Id. Because the Import Ban failed the "secure protection" element, the
Panel did not determine whether the "necessary to secure compliance" element
or the introductory clause elements had been satisfied. Id. 5.11.
156. Id. T 5.11.
157. Under GATS, the word "services" encompasses more than one hundred
different service sectors, including banking, tourism, and law. JACKSON, supra
note 45, at 291. Like GATT, GATS has an MFN provision and a national treat-
ment provision. Id. GATS, however, also contains rules of competition, a mo-
nopoly policy, and rules on government procurement. Id. See also Second
Submission of Canada, supra note 92, T 9. According to Canada,
[because] GATS is a more specific expression of the intention of WTO
Members with respect to disciplines applicable to trade in services, it
should prevail over the GATT 1994 in case of a true conflict, where the
conflict relates primarily to trade in services. The more appropriate
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
services, rather than GATT, which governs trade in goods. 158
Canada claimed that revenue streams should be split into two
different classifications: circulation revenue, which is derived
from the sale of a good, and advertising revenue, which is de-
rived from the sale of a service.' 5 9 Canada asserted that "[t]he
significant point.., is that the tax is measured not in terms of
the price of the magazines but in terms of the advertising reve-
nues it generates."' 60 Thus, according to Canada, because it had
"not undertaken any commitments in respect of the provision of
advertising services ... there [we]re no restrictions on Canada
in respect of the introduction of measures concerning the provi-
sion of advertising services.' 61
The Panel disagreed with Canada, stating that "advertising
services have long been associated with the disciplines under
GATT Article III."162 According to the Panel, numerous prior
panels examined services in the context of Article 111.163 Fur-
thermore, this tax was applied to the periodicals on a "per issue"
basis, which the Panel believed demonstrated that the Excise
Tax was applied to a good.164 The Panel concluded that because
GATS and GATT were not mutually exclusive agreements, both
agreements could apply to the Excise Tax segment of this
controversy. 165
After determining that the agreements were not mutually
exclusive, the Panel proceeded to examine the Excise Tax under
approach is clearly to interpret both agreements so as to minimize any
overlaps and resulting conflicts, and thus to preserve the integrity and
independence of each regime as the negotiators intended.
Id. 7.
158. First Submission of Canada, supra note 12, 57. See also W. Ming
Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and Cultural Pro-
tectionism, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 105, 124 (1995) (stating that the classification of
audiovisual services as either goods or services tends to obscure the treatment
of them as a public good). "[Tihree characteristics commonly distinguish serv-
ices from goods. First, production and consumption must be simultaneous in
the case of services but not goods. Second, unlike goods, services are impossible
to store. Third, services are intangible, while goods are tangible." Id.
159. First Submission of Canada, supra note 12, 58.
160. Second Submission of Canada, supra note 92, 91 5.
161. First Submission of Canada, supra note 12, 63.
162. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 91 5.18.
163. Id. (citing Canada-Import Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic
Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 27 (1992); United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993); Thai-
land- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes of Cigarettes, Feb. 20,
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990)).
164. Canada-Certain Measures panel, supra note 108, 91 5.15.
165. Id. 91 5.19.
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GATT Article 111:2, first sentence. 166 In general, Article III,
GATT's national treatment provision, attempts to ensure that
the trading countries maintain competitive conditions.167 "[T] he
rationale for the national treatment obligation of Article III is to
protect expectations of the Members as to the competitive rela-
tionship between their products and those of other Members." 168
Under Article 111:2, first sentence, imported products "shall
not be subject ... to internal taxes ... in excess of those applied
... to like domestic products."1 6 9 To determine whether the Ex-
cise Tax violated Article 111:2, first sentence, the Panel needed to
determine the following: (1) whether imported split-run periodi-
cals and domestic non-split-run periodicals constituted "like
products" and (2) if they were like products, whether Canada
subjected imported split-run periodicals to an internal tax in ex-
cess of that applied to domestic non-split-run periodicals. 170
First, the Panel attempted to discern whether imported
split-run periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals were
"like products." According to the Panel, under Article 111:2, first
sentence, "'like products' should be construed narrowly, on a
case-by-case basis, and in light of such factors as [1] the prod-
uct's end uses in a given market, [21 consumer's tastes and hab-
its, and [3] the product's properties, nature and quality."' 7 '
Because the Import Ban effectively blocked the actual im-
portation of any split-run periodicals into Canada, the Panel
was forced to perform its comparison of imported split-run peri-
odicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals on the basis of a
hypothetical import. In an unprecedented analysis, the Panel
used the Canadian and U.S. editions of the Canadian-owned pe-
riodical Harrowsmith Country Life instead of examining the pe-
riodical comparisons provided by the parties. 172 The Panel
believed that the two editions of this periodical were representa-
166. Id. 5.22-27
167. Id. 5.26.
168. Id. 5.23 (citing United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Im-
ported Substances, June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988)).
169. GATT, art. 111:2, first sentence.
170. Canada-Certain Measures Panel, supra note 108, 5.21. If the an-
swer to both questions is in the affirmative, then Article 111:2, first sentence,
would be violated. Id. However, if the answer to the first question is in the
negative, then an examination must be performed to determine whether Article
111:2, second sentence, has been violated. Id.
171. Id. 5.22. (quoting Report of the Appellate Body in Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages Case, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct.
4, 1996)).
172. Id. % 5.25.
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tive of an imported split-run periodical and a domestic non-split-
run periodical, even though they could never be in the Canadian
market at the same time.' 7 3
Based on this hypothetical scenario, the Panel assumed that
all of the volumes of Harrowsmith Country Life had been printed
in the United States and were exempted from the coverage of
the Import Ban. 174 If the Canadian edition were subsequently
exported from the United States to Canada, Harrowsmith Coun-
try Life would be subject to the Excise Tax. 175 However, accord-
ing to the Panel, if the publication of the U.S. edition were
discontinued, the publisher would be no longer subject to the Ex-
cise Tax.' 7 6 After performing this analysis, the Panel compared
the two issues of Harrowsmith Country Life before and after the
discontinuation of the U.S. edition.'7 7 The Panel concluded that
the "like products" element was satisfied because the two edi-
tions of Harrowsmith Country Life had "common end-uses and
very similar physical properties, natures, and qualities. It is
most likely that the two volumes would have been designed for
the same readership with the same tastes and habits.' u78
Next, the Panel examined whether Canada subjected the
imported split-run periodicals to an internal tax in excess of that
assessed on the domestic non-split-run periodicals.' 7 9 According
to Canada, under Article 111:2 "indirectly" was intended to refer
to "taxes that apply to inputs that contribute to the production of
a good, and not to the end products in their own right." °80 Based
on this rationale, Canada asserted that the Excise Tax did not
"apply 'indirectly' to a good within the meaning of Article
III:2."181
The Panel concluded that "indirectly" was meant not only to
refer exclusively to inputs. Instead, according to the Panel, the
Excise Tax was applied "indirectly" because it was applied on
the value of the advertisements in a periodical on a per-issue
basis rather than on the periodical itself.'8 2 Thus, because the
eighty percent Excise Tax only applied to the imported split-run
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. 5.27.
180. Id. 7 5.28.
181. Id.
182. Id. [ 5.29.
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periodicals, the Panel concluded that the Excise Tax violated Ar-
ticle 111:2, first sentence.18 3
At the end of its decision, the Panel stressed that "the abil-
ity of any Member to take measures to protect its cultural iden-
tity was not at issue" in this case.18 4 Instead, the Panel stated
that it examined the Canadian measures exclusively in relation
to its GATT-consistency.l 85 The Panel's beliefs on whether this
was a good or bad policy for the Canadian government to pursue
did not influence the Panel's decision.
C. THE DECISION OF THE WTO APPELLATE BODY
Both Canada and the United States disagreed with certain
conclusions reached by the Panel. Therefore, on April 29, 1997,
an appeal was made to the WTO Appellate Body.18 6 Canada dis-
agreed with the Panel's determinations that GATT applied to
the Excise Tax and that the Excise Tax violated Article 111:2.187
The United States, on the other hand, claimed that the Panel
erred in concluding that the favorable postal rates were a per-
missible subsidy under Article III:8(b).188
On appeal, the Appellate Body was limited to considering
issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpreta-
tions developed by the Panel. 18 9 As an initial matter, the Appel-
late Body agreed with the Panel's conclusion that "obligations
under GATT 1994 and GATS can co-exist and that one does not
override the other."190 The Appellate Body concluded that the
Excise Tax was a "measure which clearly applies to goods - it is
an excise tax on split-run editions of periodicals."1 91 Conse-
quently, the Appellate Body determined that the Excise Tax
needed to comport with the national treatment requirements of
Article 111.192
183. Id. 91 5.29-30.
184. Id. 91 5.45.
185. Id.
186. Report of the Appellate Body in Canada-Certain Measures Concern-
ing Periodicals, AB-1997-2, WT/DS31/AB/R, (adopted 30 June 1997) [hereinaf-
ter Canada-Certain Measures Appellate Body].
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id. at 6.
189. DSU, art. 17.6.
190. Canada-Certain Measures Appellate Body, supra note 186, at 14. In
other words, the existence of GATS does not diminish the application of GATT.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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1. Favorable Postal Rates
The Appellate Body overturned the Panel's decision regard-
ing the funded postal rates.193 Initially, the Appellate Body
stated that the phrase, "including payments to domestic produ-
cers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges ap-
plied consistently with the provisions of this Article and
subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic
products" in Article III:8(b) demonstrated the types of permissi-
ble subsidies. 194 The Appellate Body also placed great emphasis
on the fact that Canada never made a payment directly to the
Canadian publishers. 195 According to the Appellate Body "an
examination of the text, context, and object and purpose of Arti-
cle III:8(b) suggests that it was intended to exempt from the ob-
ligations of Article III only the payment of subsidies which
involves the expenditure of revenue by the government."196
The Appellate Body also examined the decision rendered by
the United States-Malt Beverages panel,197 which concluded
that a reduction in the taxes placed on a good did not qualify as
a subsidy payment. 19 Similarly, according to the Appellate
Body, the reduction in postal rates should not qualify as a sub-
sidy payment because Article III:8(b) was only intended to per-
mit the payment of subsidies that involve the expenditure of
revenue by a government.1 99 Because the postal rates did not
involve an actual expenditure of revenue by the Canadian gov-
ernment, the Panel concluded that the funded postal rate was
not a permissible subsidy under Article III:8(b).200
2. Excise Tax
The Appellate Body also disagreed with the Panel's "like
product" analysis in the Excise Tax context. 201 The Appellate
Body held that the example utilized by the Panel was techni-
cally incorrect, because it involved a comparison of two imported
split-run periodicals produced by the same publisher rather
than the required comparison of an imported split-run periodical
193. Id. at 24.
194. Id. at 23.
195. Id. at 22-24.
196. Id. at 24.
197. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1992).
198. Canada-Certain Measures Appellate Body, supra note 186, at 23.
199. Id. at 24.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 24.
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and a domestic non-split-run periodical. 20 2 This absence of ade-
quate analysis prevented the Appellate Body from reviewing the
"like products" issue, because of its inability to retry facts. 20 3
The Appellate Body did conclude, though, that it possessed
the power to analyze the Excise Tax in light of Article 111:2, sec-
ond sentence. 20 4 Article 111:2, second sentence, which involves a
broader category of products than "like products," prohibits
countries from applying dissimilar taxes to directly competitive
or substitutable imported products "so as to afford protection to
domestic production."20 5 To show a violation of Article 111:2, sec-
ond sentence, the United States needed to prove the following
three elements: (1) that the imported split-run periodicals and
domestic non-split-run periodicals constituted directly competi-
tive or substitutable products; (2) that the imported split-run
periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals were not simi-
larly taxed; and (3) that Canada applied this dissimilar taxation
"so as to afford protection" to domestic non-split-run
periodicals. 20 6
In the "directly competitive or substitutable products" con-
text, the Appellate Body stated that it was appropriate to ex-
amine "competition in the relevant markets as one among a
202. Id. at 15. In addition, the Appellate Body chastised the Panel for fail-
ing to use the exhibits and evidence introduced by the parties in rendering its
decision. Id. In particular, Canada submitted copies of Time, Time Canada,
and Macleans periodicals, while the United States presented editions of Pulp &
Paper and Pulp & Paper Canada. Id.
203. Id. at 16. According to Article 17.6 of the DSU, an appeal shall be lim-
ited to the issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel. Id. Because the panel report was inadequate in this
respect, the Appellate Body was unable to render a determination on the "like
products" issue. Id.
204. Id. at 16-17.
205. See GATT, art. 111:2, second sentence. Article 111:2, second sentence,
provides:
[No contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other in-
ternal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary
to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
Id.
See also supra note 136 for the text of Article 111:1, with which Article 111:2,
second sentence, requires compliance. See also GATT, ad art. III. Ad Article
III, Paragraph 2 states:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph
2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the sec-
ond sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on
the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly com-
petitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.
Id.
206. Canada-Certain Measures Appellate Body, supra note 186, at 17.
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number of means of identifying the broader category of products
that might be described as 'directly competitive or substitut-
able."' 207 In addition, the Appellate Body agreed with the
United States that the very existence of the Excise Tax provided
substantial proof that imported split-run periodicals and domes-
tic non-split-run periodicals constituted competitive products. 208
Moreover, the numerous quotations from Canadian sources fur-
ther solidified the Appellate Body's determination that imported
split-run periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals were
"directly competitive or substitutable" products. 209
The Appellate Body did, however, refrain from universally
classifying all periodicals as directly competitive or substitut-
able. Instead, it stated that "[a] periodical containing mainly
current news is not directly competitive or substitutable with a
periodical dedicated to gardening, chess, sports, music or cui-
sine."210 It did conclude that news periodicals, such as Time,
Time Canada, and Maclean's, contained similar editorial con-
tent and were "directly competitive or substitutable in spite of
the 'Canadian' content of Maclean's."211 According to the Appel-
late Body, "[tihe competitive relationship is even closer in the
case of more specialized magazines, like Pulp & Paper as com-
pared to Pulp & Paper Canada."212 The Appellate Body con-
cluded that "imported split-run periodicals and domestic non-
split-run periodicals are directly competitive or substitutable
products so far as they are part of the same segment of the Ca-
nadian market for periodicals." 213
The Appellate Body did agree with the Panel's conclusion
that because Canada subjected only the split-run periodicals to
the eighty percent Excise Tax, it did not similarly tax imported
split-run periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals. 214
Furthermore, the Appellate Body determined that, based on the
"magnitude of the differential taxation, the several statements
of the Government of Canada's explicit policy objectives in intro-
207. Id.
208. Id. at 18-19.
209. Id. at 19. For example, the Task Force Report stated "[Canadian pub-
lishers'] English-language consumer magazines face significant competition for
sales from imported consumer magazines. In large measure, this is because the
majority of the magazines are from the United States and are a close substi-
tute. . . ." Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 40.
210. Canada-Certain Measures Appellate Body, supra note 186, at 20.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 20-21.
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ducing the measure and the demonstrated actual protective ef-
fect of the measure . . . the design.. . of ... the Excise Tax Act
is clearly to afford protection to the production of Canadian peri-
odicals."2 15 Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded that the
Excise Tax contravened Article 111:2, second sentence. 216
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SPORTS ILLUSTRATED CANADA
DISPUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF FUTURE DISPUTES
A. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY DECISIONS
The Sports Illustrated Canada decisions will certainly influ-
ence the resolution of future trade disputes. The decisions of the
Panel and the Appellate Body provide insight into how the WTO
will construe certain GATT provisions under similar circum-
stances. For future panels, the favorable postal rates under Ar-
ticle III:8(b) and the overlapping spheres of GATS and GATT are
the two most important resolutions rendered by the Panel and
the Appellate Body.
1. Favorable Postal Rates
The Appellate Body, in contrast to the Panel, concluded that
the favorable postal rates were inconsistent with Article
III:8(b). 217 In this dispute, support existed for either interpreta-
tion. On the one hand, the funded rate did fail to satisfy the
textual requirements of Article III:8(b), because the Department
of Canadian Heritage did not actually pay the subsidy exclu-
sively to the Canadian periodical publishers. Instead, the funds
were transferred to Canada Post, which provided the funded
rate to the Canadian publishers. 218 On the other hand, the mea-
sure essentially accomplished the same result as a subsidy paid
directly to the Canadian periodical publishers but in a more ad-
ministratively convenient and cost-effective manner. By utiliz-
ing this process, the Canadian government saved an enormous
amount of time and money, because the postal rates essentially
were set at intervals that provided the same benefits to the Ca-
nadian periodical publishers as paying the subsidy directly to
them.219
215. Id. at 22.
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 49-50 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
Unfortunately for Canada, the Appellate Body's conclusion
will increase the cost of providing the subsidy without furnish-
ing any substantial accompanying benefit. Essentially, the Ap-
pellate Body's conclusion will merely change the form of the
subsidy and not its substance. The publishers will still receive
the economic benefits of the subsidy, only now they will receive
the benefits directly rather than indirectly.
Paying the subsidy directly to the Canadian periodical pub-
lishers increases administrative costs for many reasons. First,
the Canadian government must determine the dollar amount of
the subsidy to pay to each individual Canadian periodical pub-
lisher. Clearly, a periodical with few subscribers that publishes
only a few issues a year is not entitled to the same subsidy
amount as a periodical that publishes numerous issues each
year and has a large number of subscribers. The postal rate
subsidy allowed the Canadian government to avoid this prob-
lem, because the Canadian periodicals determined the amount
of the subsidy they received based on the number of periodicals
mailed.220 In contrast, the Canadian government must now de-
termine the subsidy amount to pay to each of the 1400 different
Canadian periodicals. 22 1
After the Canadian government determines the subsidy
amount each publisher should receive, it will need to transfer
this amount to them. Sending a subsidy payment to each of the
publishers of the 1400 Canadian periodicals 222 would clearly be
time-consuming and burdensome, especially compared to the
prior process of simply transferring the necessary funds to Can-
ada Post.223 Thus, from a cost-effectiveness standpoint, the Ap-
pellate Body's conclusion results in a less desirable solution to
this issue than the Panel's conclusion.
Based on the economic inadequacies of the Appellate Body's
decision, it must have been based on policy considerations.
Although not explicitly stated, the Appellate Body may have
been concerned that permitting the Canadian postal rate sub-
sidy essentially would have resulted in the insertion of an im-
plied administrative convenience exception in Article III:8(b).
The Appellate Body may have believed such an exception would
result in numerous GATT violations being cloaked in the guise
220. Id.
221. Task Force Report, supra note 19, at iv.
222. Id.
223. See supra note 49-50 and accompanying text.
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of administrative convenience. The Appellate Body's decision
assuredly prevents this type of problem.
It is unlikely, though, that numerous GATT violations
would be accomplished through the use of an administrative
convenience exception. For instance, in the current dispute,
Canada Post apparently was using all of the funding it received
from the Department of Canadian Heritage to provide the
favorable postal rates to the Canadian periodicals. There was
no evidence that it was withholding any of the funding. How-
ever, even if Canada Post had been withholding funding, the
problem the Panel in European Economic Community-Pay-
ments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oil-
seeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins ("Oilseeds")224
attempted to prevent was not present in the current dispute.
Unlike the Oilseeds context, Canada Post was a governmental
entity, not a processor. Even if Canada Post had retained some
of the funding it received, this funding would still have re-
mained within the Canadian government. In contrast, the Oil-
seeds panel was concerned with preventing countries from
providing too much funding to the processors in order to protect
the domestic products. 225 Thus, the decision of the Oilseeds
panel was inapposite to the resolution of the current dispute.
It is clear that the Panel, and not the Appellate Body, ren-
dered the more viable solution to the postal rate subsidy issue.
Allowing the postal rate subsidy makes sense from both a cost-
effectiveness standpoint and a policy-based standpoint. Thus,
Canada should have been permitted to continue its utilization of
Canada Post as a conduit through which to provide the postal
rate subsidy.
2. GATS v. GATT
Because the United States possessed a strong claim that the
Excise Tax violated Article III's national treatment require-
ments, Canada's best defense was that GATS rather than GATT
governed this area of the dispute. Both the Panel and the Appel-
late Body disagreed with this assertion. According to the Panel
and the Appellate Body, GATS and GATT never were intended
224. Report of the Panel on European Economic Community-Payments
and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related
Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86, 137
(1990)).
225. Id. %1 136-41.
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to be mutually exclusive agreements. 226 They asserted that nu-
merous panels had concluded that services could be examined
under Article III of GATT. 2 27 The Panel and Appellate Body de-
cided to faithfully adhere to these prior decisions.
The resolution of this issue was not as obvious as the Panel
and Appellate Body made it appear. Faithful adherence to the
prior panel decisions by future panels could result in erroneous
resolution of trade disputes. For example, a future trade dispute
could encompass trade involving periodicals provided to custom-
ers via the Internet. In a situation such as this, it is much more
difficult to discern whether this is a transaction involving goods
or a transaction involving services. In the Sports Illustrated
Canada controversy, the Panel and Appellate Body adhered to
the prior panel decisions and easily concluded that a periodical
is a good. A future panel, though, could conclude that the peri-
odical, like the advertising services in the current dispute, con-
stitutes only a segment of the overall transaction. The Internet,
like the periodical in the current dispute, would be the means of
delivering the editorial and advertising content. However, un-
like the periodical in the current dispute, Internet delivery
would probably be classified as a service. Thus, in a situation
such as this, faithful adherence to prior panel decisions could
result in an erroneous resolution. Instead, a future panel will
need to perform a more in-depth analysis of the spheres of GATS
and GATT. The implication in the current dispute that this was
a relatively straightforward decision for the Panel and Appellate
Body is somewhat misleading. In actuality, numerous future
panels will be forced to struggle with defining the spheres of
these agreements.
B. CANADA'S OPTIONS IN RESOLVING THE CONTROVERSY
1. Canada's Options Before the United States Initiated
Proceedings in the WTO
Canada could have attempted to resolve the Sports Illus-
trated Canada controversy before the United States began dis-
pute resolution proceedings in the WTO. One alternative would
have been for Canada to include Sports Illustrated Canada in
the grandfather provision, 228 thereby excluding it from the Ex-
cise Tax's coverage. This course of action could have prevented
226. See supra notes 162-65, 190 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 86-89.
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the Sports Illustrated Canada controversy from ever occurring.
Resolving the dispute in this manner certainly would not have
looked as discriminatory, because an American business operat-
ing in Canada, especially one as powerful as Time Warner,
would not have been removed from the Canadian market. Had
Canada opted for this alternative, the United States might not
have complained to the WTO. The Excise Tax would have been
less important to the U.S. government because no American
business would have suffered an immediate, verifiable injury.
The fact that the Import Ban existed for over thirty years before
the United States challenged it supports this inference. 229
Even if this alternative would not have prevented the
Sports Illustrated Canada controversy from occurring, it would
have at least postponed the dispute until another American
split-run periodical attempted to enter the Canadian market.
Such a delay would have been very beneficial to Canadian peri-
odical publishers. The publishers could have continued to oper-
ate their businesses without the threat of new imported split-
run periodicals entering the Canadian market in the near fu-
ture. The delay would also have given the Canadian govern-
ment more time to analyze its current policy regarding
periodicals. During this time, the Canadian government could
have assessed its options and implemented a GATT-consistent
vehicle through which to protect its periodical industry.
The overriding drawback to including Sports Illustrated
Canada in the grandfather provision was its popularity in Can-
ada and its ability to funnel advertising revenues away from the
Canadian periodicals. 230 Given the instability of the Canadian
periodical industry,231 a substantial number of Canadian peri-
odicals might have been unable to survive if Sports Illustrated
Canada had been permitted to remain in the Canadian market.
Faced with this possibility, the Canadian government found in-
clusion of Sports Illustrated Canada in the grandfather provi-
sion to be an unattractive alternative. Instead, to sustain the
industry's viability, the Canadian government had to remove
Sports Illustrated Canada from the Canadian market.
Another, perhaps more obvious, alternative for the Cana-
dian government was to negotiate a settlement to this dispute
with the United States. The countries could have made cross-
sector concessions. For example, in exchange for the right to
229. See supra notes 64-67.
230. See supra notes 64-67.
231. See supra notes 24-31.
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maintain its GATT-inconsistent periodical measures, Canada
could have agreed to provide trade concessions to the United
States in a different industry. Depending on the trade conces-
sions provided by Canada, this course of action could have re-
sulted in a very desirable solution for both countries. It
certainly would have been a very beneficial result for the Cana-
dian periodical industry, because the status quo would have
been maintained. The Canadian periodical publishers would not
have been required to adapt to any new measures. Instead, the
measures around which the Canadian periodical publishers had
organized their operations would remain in place.
Negotiation, though, would have adversely affected the Ca-
nadian industry in which Canada granted the trade concessions.
Essentially, negotiation would have forced Canada to sacrifice
the well-being of one of its industries to retain a viable periodical
industry. Consequently, for Canada this alternative had the
tendency of curing one problem while at the same time causing
another problem.
For the United States, the main drawback to negotiating a
settlement was that Sports Illustrated Canada and other poten-
tial U.S. split-run periodical publishers would continue to be
completely banned from the Canadian market. As a result, the
United States was hesitant to agree to this type of resolution.
Canada would have had to provide trade concessions enor-
mously favorable to the United States for this alternative to suc-
ceed. Thus, negotiation would not have been a very desirable
alternative for either country.
2. Canada's Options After the Panel and Appellate Body
Decisions
At the present time, the key for Canada is to devise a
method of ensuring its periodical industry's viability while also
satisfying its GATT obligations. One option for Canada is to
make the subsidy payments directly to the Canadian publishers.
Based on the Appellate Body's decision on this issue, a direct
subsidy would assuredly constitute a permissible subsidy under
Article III:8(b).232 One advantage of this course of action is that
it would keep the prices of the Canadian periodicals lower,
which would definitely benefit Canadian periodical purchasers.
Obviously, the less Canadian periodical purchasers are required
to spend on a periodical, the more likely they are to purchase it.
232. See supra notes 193-200.
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These lower prices would prevent a depression in the consump-
tion of Canadian periodicals, which would directly benefit the
Canadian periodical publishers. Strictly in terms of supply and
demand, the direct subsidy is an attractive alternative.
A direct subsidy would also strengthen the Canadian gov-
ernment's long-standing claim that its true motivation for pro-
tecting Canada's cultural industries is the maintenance of a
distinct Canadian culture. 233 A direct subsidy would demon-
strate that this policy really is important to the Canadian gov-
ernment and not merely an attempt at economic protectionism,
as the USTR has consistently characterized it.234 In addition, a
direct subsidy would place the Canadian government's policy of
protecting its culture out in the open and provide the Canadian
public with an opportunity to scrutinize it. Strong support from
the Canadian public certainly would further justify this policy's
position in the Canadian government.
The main drawback to a direct subsidy is that the Canadian
public may not support it. The Canadian public may conclude
that the Canadian government should not be spending Cana-
dian tax dollars in this fashion. This type of response from the
Canadian public, though, is unlikely to occur. Currently, ap-
proximately sixty-two percent of the Canadian public believes
that the Canadian government should provide some type of sup-
port for Canadian culture.23 5 Based on this figure, it appears
that the Canadian public would support the payment of a direct
subsidy to the Canadian periodical publishers.
Another drawback to a direct subsidy is that the Canadian
government must provide a substantial amount of funding to the
Canadian periodical publishers. If Canada had not previously
"subsidized" the industry,236 this funding requirement could be
a significant impediment to providing a direct subsidy. Can-
ada's prior "subsidization" of the periodical industry, though,
demonstrates that it possesses the resources necessary to pro-
vide a direct subsidy to the periodical industry.
If the Canadian public concludes that a direct subsidy is not
a viable alternative, the Canadian government could decide to
simply remove all of its culture-protecting policies and allow di-
rect competition within the Canadian periodical market. This
course of action would force Canadian periodicals to either be-
233. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 16-18 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 11.
236. See supra note 49.
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come more efficient or risk losing their share of the Canadian
periodical market. The pressure of direct competition would
probably improve the quality of Canadian periodicals because
direct competition would force continuous improvement in order
for Canadian publishers to compete with foreign periodical
publishers.
Assuming Canadian publishers could overcome their cur-
rent inefficiencies, this course of action could provide the best
long-term solution for the Canadian periodical industry. Cana-
dian publishers would no longer rely on support from the Cana-
dian government. Instead, they would be self-reliant, which
would remove the governmental component, and its accompany-
ing constant changes in policy, from the equation. Allowing di-
rect competition in the periodical market could also benefit the
Canadian government. Because it would not be funding the Ca-
nadian periodical industry, a substantial amount of money 23 7
would be available to support a different industry.
The results of allowing direct competition in the Canadian
periodical market, however, are uncertain. It is a strong possi-
bility that Canadian publishers do not possess the resources
necessary to make such a drastic transition. 238 As a result, di-
rect competition could cause a substantial number of Canadian
periodicals to discontinue publication, clearly not the result de-
sired by the Canadian government. Therefore, because the di-
rect subsidy option is available and provides a certain amount of
stability in the currently unstable Canadian periodical industry,
it is probably the best option for the Canadian government at
this time. Canada would still have the option of allowing direct
competition in the periodical industry at some point in the fu-
ture, should the Canadian periodical industry become more fi-
nancially stable.
C. WTO v. NAFTA
The USTR's decision to resolve this dispute in the WTO will
influence the resolution of future trade disputes. It is important
to note that Sports Illustrated Canada was not an imported
split-run periodical, because it was actually printed in Can-
ada. 239 Only the editorial content, which Time Warner sent to
Canada via satellite, was imported into Canada. 240 Conse-
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 24-31.
239. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
240. Id.
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quently, the United States' challenge to the Excise Tax was
based on the hypothetical imported split-run periodicals that
would be harmed by the Excise Tax absent Canada's protection-
ist measures. Under GATT, this challenge was clearly permissi-
ble, because Article III protects competitive conditions. 241 Thus,
no actual injury is required for an Article III violation to occur.
Instead, only the competitive conditions must be injured, which
they clearly were in the current dispute.242 The Import Ban, Ex-
cise Tax, and favorable postal rates obviously served to tip the
competitive conditions in favor of the Canadian periodicals.
According to the USTR, the main reason it decided to re-
solve the dispute in the WTO was that a WTO resolution could
influence a much broader range of countries. 243 A WTO resolu-
tion would apply to all Member countries in any subsequent dis-
putes involving cultural products. Conversely, a resolution
under NAFTA could have been used only against Canada and
Mexico--obviously not the broad application the United States
desired.
For the USTR, another disadvantage of using NAFTA is
that its resolutions are nonbinding. 244 Under NAFTA, the dis-
pute had the potential to continue for many years, because Can-
ada could have ignored any NAFTA resolution and proceeded to
invoke its measures on the imported split-run periodicals. In
contrast, WTO rulings are binding.245 The WTO would enable
the United States to secure a resolution enforceable against the
Canadian government. Thus, support is also present for the
USTR's assertion that the WTO provided a more concrete basis
upon which to resolve a dispute.
While the WTO's breadth of coverage and binding resolu-
tion mechanism may have provided advantages for the United
States, the circumstances of the controversy demonstrate the
real reason the United States chose this forum. A significant
reason the United States chose the WTO was because the Cana-
dian measures did not violate Canada's obligations under
NAFTA. In fact, NAFTA's cultural exemption 246 granted Can-
241. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
242. NAFTA incorporates GATT's national treatment provisions into it.
Thus, like GATT, only an injury to competitive conditions is necessary to violate
NAFTA's national treatment provisions. NAFTA, art. 301.
243. See U.S. Initiates WTO Case Over Canadian Split-Run Policies, Postal
Rates, supra note 96, at 7.
244. NAFTA, art. 2018.
245. DSU, art. 21.
246. See supra note 46.
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ada the power to maintain the Import Ban, enact the Excise
Tax, and administer the favorable postal rates. Because Can-
ada's regulation of the periodical industry was entirely consis-
tent with NAFTA's requirements, a challenge under NAFTA
was essentially foreclosed. Consequently, the United States was
forced to use the WTO if it wanted to successfully challenge the
Canadian measures.
Because GATT contains no cultural exemption,247 using the
WTO enabled the United States to circumvent the cultural ex-
emption that Canada had fought so hard to have included in
NAFTA. In the WTO, Canada's measures would be required to
conform with the relevant GATT provisions, including Article
III's national treatment requirements. For all practical pur-
poses, using the WTO to resolve this dispute would render
NAFTA's cultural exemption virtually nonexistent. Thus, con-
trary to its asserted reason, the USTR's choice of the WTO was
actually a strategic determination undertaken to circumvent
NAFTA's cultural exemption.
Because of the proliferation of regional trade agreements,
the forum shopping engaged in by the United States in the
Sports Illustrated Canada controversy could become a constant
problem in the international dispute resolution arena. To com-
bat this problem in the future, GATT should be modified. A pro-
vision should be added stating that if a country agrees to a
provision in a regional trade agreement that is GATT-consis-
tent, but is not specifically provided for in GATT, then GATT
cannot be used to resolve the dispute. Instead, the dispute must
be resolved under the regional agreement. A provision such as
this would substantially cut down the potential to utilize one
trade agreement to avoid the obligations of another trade agree-
ment. At the very least, this would provide some certainty in an
uncertain area of trade that is becoming more important with
the increase in regional trade agreements. Countries would be
more confident that the obligations they negotiate in an agree-
ment would not be circumvented through the use of GATT.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the Sports Illustrated Canada controversy, Canada
struck out in its attempt to protect its periodical industry from
imported split-run periodicals. By and large, the decisions ren-
dered by the Panel and Appellate Body in Canada-Certain
247. See supra notes 47-48.
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Measures Concerning Periodicals appear to be GATT-consistent.
The Appellate Body's determination that the funded postal rates
contravene Article III:8(b), however, arguably constituted an er-
roneous decision rendered solely on policy grounds. The Appel-
late Body's conclusion substantially increases administrative
costs without providing any substantive benefit. It merely re-
sults in a change in the form of the subsidy and not its
substance.
Presently, the best course of action for the Canadian govern-
ment to pursue is the payment of a subsidy directly to the Cana-
dian publishers. This would be GATT-consistent, providing the
Canadian public with an opportunity to determine if this is an
appropriate governmental policy. Furthermore, it would pro-
vide support to the Canadian government's claims that its real
intention has always been to maintain a separate and distinct
Canadian culture.
The resolution of the Canada-Certain Measures Concern-
ing Periodicals dispute is certain to have a far-reaching impact
on the resolution of future trade disputes, especially those in-
volving bilateral and multilateral trade agreements between
WTO Member countries. Through its decision to resolve this
dispute in the WTO, the United States essentially nullified
NAFTA's cultural exemption. In the future, other countries will
attempt to employ similar strategies to avoid unfavorable provi-
sions contained in regional agreements. Thus, GATT should be
modified to prevent this type of forum shopping in the future.
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